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THE CHALLENGE OF COST-BENEFIT DETERMINATIONS IN BIRD-DAMAGE CONTROL PROGRAMS
Richard A. Dolbeer
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Ohio Field Station
Sandusky, Ohio 44870
Birds cause damage to a variety of crops in North America and, at
least for blackbirds feeding on corn, there are fairly accurate estimates
of the amount of damage that occurs (Stone et al. 1972, Stickley  et al.
1 9 7 9 ) . To combat these depredation problems, a variety of management
tools (cultural methods, mechanical scare devices, chemical toxicants,
and repellents) have been developed and are routinely recommended to
f a r m e r s . Unfortunately, little effort has gone into examining the
anticipated or actual losses in relation to the effectiveness and costs
of the recommended damage control programs.
With energy sources becoming more expensive and concerns over the
environmental impact of control programs increasing, vertebrate-damage
control personnel must do a better job of determining economic benefits
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  c o s t s . The user must be provided with more reliable and
complete information than is done at present concerning the situations
in which a particular management tool should or should not be used to
a c h i e v e  a  n e t  b e n e f i t .
The objectives of this report are (1) to discuss, in general terms,
the economic impact of blackbird damage to corn and how we should interpret
this impact and (2) to suggest the type of research and management data
that need to be assembled to assess the benefits of blackbird damage control
i n  c o r n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  c o s t s . Although I use blackbird damage to corn as
an example, I feel these principles can be extended to many other situations.
involving vertebrate pest control in agriculture.
.
The Economic Impact of Blackbird Damage to Corn
Bird damage to agricultural field crops, and especially blackbird
d a m a g e  t o  c o r n , is undoubtedly more objectively quantified on a state or
regional basis than is the damage caused by other vertebrate pests. T h i s
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is primarily because bird damage is often easier to objectively measure
than are losses due to rodents or predators.
The examination of studies during the past 10 years where blackbird
damage to corn has been measured on a statewide level leads to an inter-
esting conclusion (Table 1); in all locations, losses to birds represent
less than 1% of the yield of the crop. Average losses in other crop types
caused by other avian species show a similar pattern of less than 1%
d a m a g e  ( e . g . , starlings in winter wheat-- Dolbeer 1979, waterfowl in small
g r a i n  c r o p s - - S u g d e n  1 9 7 6 ) . For corn in the midwestern United States, losses
caused by insects, weeds, disease and fungi probably total over 20% of the
total potential harvest (Jugenheimer 1976:261,  Pimentel 1976, McEwen  1978)
and harvesting procedures leave 5% or more of the crop in the fields
(Jugenheimer 1976:212). Even though the total dollar figure for blackbird
damage to corn for a state, such as Ohio, may reach several million dollars
annually (Table 1), the average loss of corn to blackbirds is quite small
compared with losses from other sources and one might wonder why it is even
c o n s i d e r e d  a  p r o b l e m .
The answer lies in the sporadic nature and unequal distribution of
b i r d  d a m a g e . If all farmers received a loss to birds of 1% or less, then
t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  p r o b l e m . That this is not the case is shown clearly by
estimates of blackbird damage to corn in 7,237 fields in 19 counties in
Ohio obtained over the period 1968-76 (Dolbeer 1980). The distribution
of losses among these fields was as follows:
tt
P ercent of crop lost to blackbirds <  1 l-5 6-10 > 10
P e r c e n t o f f i e l d s 8 5 . 4 1 2 . 1 1 . 5 1 . 0
The vast majority of farmers are receiving insignificant amounts of loss
with only a small percentage receiving more than 5%--the  threshold level
above which an investment in damage prevention may be economically justified
( s e e  b e l o w ) . Statewide in Ohio the percentage of fields receiving over 5%
loss is probably even less than the 2.5% indicated above because the 19
counties used in this survey contained most areas in the state that received
h e a v y  b l a c k b i r d  d a m a g e  t o  c o r n .
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Two important facts emerge from this pattern of damage. First, bird
damage problems in corn, unlike many traditional pest problems in agriculture,
are more scattered and unequally distributed among farmers and fields.
Management recommendations cannot be routinely issued as is done for weed
control but must be directed only toward those few farmers having severe
enough problems to justify the investment in control measures.
Second, the unequal distribution of damage has an important impact on
the way we interpret the actual economic loss on a statewide basis. I n  t h e
period 1977-79, the total economic impact of blackbird damage to corn in
Ohio averaged $5.5 million/year (range $3.8 to $6.8 million) (Table 1).
Yet, based on the distribution of damage for 1966-74, about 25% of this 10~s
($1.4 million) was derived from fields receiving less than 1% loss--a level
of loss that could not be reduced further economically--and another 40%
($2.2 million) was derived from fields receiving 1 to 5% loss--levels of
loss that often are also of marginal importance because the costs of reducing
them would exceed the benefits of reduced damage (see below). Thus, perhaps
at most, only half of this $5.5 million annual loss is loss that is signifi-
cant enough economically to justify the implementation of research and man-
a g e m e n t  p r o g r a m s . The remaining loss is too diffuse, too insignificant in
the context of the total farm program, to justify an economic investment.
Thus, while the total dollar loss of blackbird damage to corn averages
$5.5 million annually, the loss about which something can be done with a
net benefit, may be substantially less. This economically significant loss,
and not the total loss, should be what is considered in justifying manage-
ment expenditures and developing damage control programs. It is not enough
to just say that blackbirds cause $5.5 million damage to corn annually in
O h i o . One must also state the amount of that loss about which something
can be done with a net economic benefit.
Costs of Control Versus Predicted Benefits -- A Simple Model
The above discussion has referred to the economics of bird damage in
the broad context of the impact on a crop over an entire state. In dis-
cussing damage to individual fields, the simple maxim that should guide us
is that Benefits (dollars saved by reduced damage) exceed the costs of
c o n t r o l . This is an obvious statement, yet in many situations the two
factors, benefits and costs, are not adequately considered in the research
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and development of control techniques nor in the use of these techniques
once they become operational. Part of the reason is political. There will
often be pressure to solve vertebrate pest problems from a public-relations
viewpoint regardless of economics (e.g., Graham 1971, 1978). The wildlife
manager can do little about this. However, I feel that another major factor
is that we have not developed a simple framework or model by which to com-
pare costs of control versus benefits. Such a model would provide the
guidance or structure for collecting the right types of data to allow mean-
ingful and practical comparisons of costs and benefits.
One method of developing this framework is through the use of a cost-
b e n e f i t  g r a p h  ( F i g .  1 ) . On the x-axis is the cost of anticipated damage
per acre and on the y-axis is the cost of the control measure per acre.
T h e  e q u a t i o n :
Y < bx,-
where b represents the fraction of damage expected to be
reduced by the control measure (i.e., efficacy),
represents the breakeven point for the use of a control measure. T h e
anticipated benefits (bx) must equal or exceed the costs (y) before a
management tool should be used.
A s  a n  e x a m p l e , Figure 1 depicts the cost-benefit equations for the use
of Avitrol, a chemical frightening agent, and propane exploders to reduce
blackbird damage to corn in Ohio based on data from Stickley et al. (1972).
The equation for Avitrol use, y = 0.56x, indicates that Avitrol reduces
damage by an average of 56%. Likewise, the equation for propane exploders,
y = 0.81x,  indicates an effectiveness of 81%. Additional studies by
Stickley et al. (1976) and Linehan  (1972, unpubl.) also indicate Avitrol
and exploder efficacy in cornfields in Ohio at about 50 and 80%, respectively.
The cost of aerially-applied Avitrol is currently $5.55/acre  and the
cost of exploders/acre (assuming 1 exploder/5 acres as in Stickley et al.
1972) is about $5.00/acre  (Woronecki et al. 1979, Dolbeer et al. 1979). Thus
the breakeven points for justifying Avitrol and exploder use are anticipated
damage levels of $9.91/acre  and $6.17/acre,  respectively (Table 2).
Assuming a market price of $2.15/bushel  and yields of 101 bushels/acre
(Carter 1979),  then anticipated blackbird damage to an average field in
northern Ohio would have to be over 4.6% before Avitrol use could be
j u s t i f i e d . F o r  p r o p a n e  e x p l o d e r s , the damage level would have to be over
f
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2.8%. As can be seen in Figure 1, as long as the anticipated or projected
damage level falls to the right side of the line representing the cost-
b e n e f i t  e q u a t i o n , the management measure is justified economically.
Obviously, under an efficacy value of 0.56, only a small percentage of
fields (<  2.5%) could ever warrant using Avitrol. Of course, under situa-
tions where the efficacy was increased, the line representing the equation
y = bx would b ecome  steeper (until b = 1) and a greater number of fields
could benefit from the use of the control measure. Even if the efficacy of
Avitrol was lOO%, damage must exceed 2.6% before it is economically justified.
As a final example, I show in Figure 2A,  superimposed on the cost-benefit
equation for Avitrol from Figure 1, the distribution of blackbird damage for
21 cornfields in northern Ohio that received commercial Avitrol treaments in
1 9 7 6 . Avitrol was apparently quite ineffective in these fields because of
rapid bait disappearance due to cricket (Gryllus) feeding (Woronecki et al.
1 9 7 9 ) . Thus, the distribution of damage levels for these fields is probably
close to what it would have been if no Avitrol had been used. As can be
seen, even if Avitrol had been at its 56% level of effectiveness, only 2 of
the 21 fields for which farmers requested treatments could have achieved
n e t  b e n e f i t s . The other fields did not have enough potential damage to
w a r r a n t  A v i t r o l  u s e . Even if we assume that Avitrol did reduce damage by
56% in each of these 21 fields, only 8 (38%) could have received net
b e n e f i t s  ( F i g .  2 B ) .
Undefined Factors in Cost-Benefit Analyses
Three factors this cost-benefit equation has not attempted to incor-
porate are (1) possible beneficial aspects of depredating birds, (2) the
external costs and benefits of control programs, and (3) the intangible,
aesthetic and nuisance attributes of the pest birds.
Dolbeer (1980) noted that red-winged blackbirds (Agelaius phoeniceus)
often consume important insect pests of corn such as corn borers (Pyrausta
nubilalis), rootworm  beetles (Diabrotica spp.), and earworms  (Heliothis zea).
Few studies (Mott and Stone 1973) have been undertaken to measure beneficial
feeding effects of blackbirds in terms of increased yield or decreased
d a m a g e  t o  a  c r o p . If beneficial effects were found to occur this would
have to be incorporated into the equation by either adjusting costs of
control upwards or reducing benefits of control. Benefits external to the
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c o r n  c r o p , such as from blackbirds feeding on insects in a
positive carry-over effect of control measures in the corn
nerable crop such as sunflowers, would be difficult to inc
lfalfa or from a
to another vu l-
orporate as
aa
w ould external costs such as pesticide pollution or the kill of non-target
birds resulting from control programs. Lastly, intangible,aesthetic or
nuisance attributes, such as the net pleasure derived by the people of
Ohio from male redwings singing and displaying on their territories in
spring, or the net inconvenience caused by roosting blackbirds near a town
in the fall, would be extremely difficult to quantify and incorporate into
equations on cost-benefits.
cc
C onclusions
The major question raised in this report is how often does the type of
situation occur in bird-damage control whereby the costs of routinely-
recommended management measures exceed the value of the crop damage that
i s  r e d u c e d . I do not know the answer but my general experience in the
field suggests that this situation frequently occurs. Because of the
highly visible nature of birds and of the damage they inflict in fields, a
farmer's awareness and concern for bird losses often exceed the actual
magnitude of the economic threat. Vertebrate pest control workers must in
the future put as much emphasis on developing guidelines for the economical
use of management tools as currently goes into the research and development
o f  n e w  t o o l s .
The model presented in this report is admittedly over-simplified in
relation to the real-world situation. I have already discussed the lack
of input on beneficial aspects of birds and external costs. I n  a d d i t i o n ,
the use of a single value for efficacy (b), such as 0.56 for Avitrol, is
not realistic because efficacy can vary under different farming and
t r e a t m e n t  c o n d i t i o n s . Also, in many situations it is quite difficult to
predict what the damage level in a particular field will be. However,
these gaps should not detract from our attempts to use cost-benefit
equations with current information available. As mentioned above, the
use of such equations or models forces us to better define the critical
types of data needed to improve the accuracy of our cost-benefit predic-
t i o n s . In addition even using rather crude estimates of efficacy and
predicted loss, these equations are improvements over the fuzzy "mental
i
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models" or guesses that are often used at present in recommending bird-
damage control measures. The use of such equations can help us to avoid
the wasteful and inappropriate use of management tools demonstrated in
F i g u r e  2 .
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T a b l e  1 . Statewide estimates of blackbird damage to corn in the United
States derived from objective field surveys.
L o c a t i o n
Y e a r
o f
s t u d y
P e r c e n t T o t a l
o f d o l l a r s
c r o p l o s t
l o s t ( m i l l i o n s )
S o u r c e
o f
d a t a
O h i o 1 9 7 7 0 . 6 7 3 . 8 8
1 9 7 8 0 . 8 0 5 . 9 0
1 9 7 9 0 . 7 1 6 . 7 8
S t i c k l e y e t a l . 1 9 7 9
U n p u b l . F i s h & W i l d -
life Serv. reports
U n p u b l . F i s h & W i l d -
life Serv. reports
K e n t u c k y 1 9 7 7 0 . 4 8 1 . 2 0 Stickley et al. 1979
Tennessee 1 9 7 7 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 8 Stickley et al. 1979
..
N e w  Y o r k 1 9 7 1 0 . 6 0 Stone et al. 1973
T a b l e  2 . Determining the break-even point (where the value of the crop saved
equals the blackbird damage control measures for field corn in Ohio.
C o n t r o l
m e t h o d
c o s t  o f E f f i c a c y Loss ($)/acre required
control/acre o f  c o n t r o l before control is justified
- - -  -__-_- - - - - - - -
(Y) = (b) * (x)
A v i t r o l
E x p l o d e r
$5.55a 0 . 5 6 ' 9 . 9 1
$5.00b 0 . 8 1 ' 6 . 1 7
aWoronecki  et al. 1979
bDolbeer  et al. 1979
'Stickley et al. 1972
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F i g .  1 . Cost benefit equations for Avitrol and propane exploders to
reduce blackbird damage to corn in Ohio. Anticipated damage
must be greater than $9.91/acre  for use of Avitrol and $6.17/
acre for use of exploders.
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F i g .  2 . Cost-benefit determinations for 21 cornfields in Ohio where
farmers used commercial applications of Avitrol in 1976 to
reduce blackbird damage. The Avitrol applications were
probably ineffective because of rapid bait disappearance
caused by cricket feeding (Woronecki et al. 1979); thus
the final distribution of damage (indicated by x's in
graph A) for the 21 fields was a measure of the distribution
of loss with no control measure used. The graph indicates
that even if Avitrol had worked at the expected 56%
effectiveness, only 2 of the 21 fields (10%) would have
benefited from its use. Even if we assume that Avitrol did
work and that the final damage distribution shown in Fig. 2A
reflects a 56% damage reduction in each field, the majority
of farmers could not have achieved a net benefit. In
Fig. 2B we have increased the damage level in each field to
reflect the projected loss before Avitrol reduced damage
b y  5 6 % . Only 8 of the 21 fields (38%) would have benefited
f r o m  A v i t r o l  u s e .
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